THE CHANGING ROLE OF ARMED FORCES
FROM COUNTER INSURGENCY TO
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE

SCRIPT
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. In spite of the successful uprooting of physical acts of insurgencies by Sri Lankan armed forces, there are many invisible threats posed by paramilitary groups which are executed on Sri Lankan soil as well as in foreign countries becoming a threat to our territorial defense.

2. Counter-insurgency operations involve actions taken by the recognized government of a nation to contain or quell an insurgency taken up against it. In the main, the insurgents seek to destroy or erase the political authority of the defending authorities in a population they seek to control, and the counter-insurgent forces seek to protect that authority and reduce or eliminate the supplanting authority of the insurgents.

3. Territorial defence of a country generally means the survival of the country by using its economic, military and political power and the effective exercise of the diplomacy. A country cannot maintain high level of Territorial defence giving priority to only one of these components, since each component is of equal importance. Moreover, it is not possible to raise the standards of the economy by focusing on them in isolation.

4. War and terrorism in Sri Lanka directly and largely affected the economy and the other development aspects of the country. The challenges faced by Sri Lanka after defeating LTTE can be identified as possible future threats from separatism, post conflict resettlement, ethnic re-integration, regional integration of the nation, foreign interventions and Diaspora involvement in the current context of Sri Lanka. After defeat of the LTTE by Sri Lankan armed forces, there are indications of new insurgents who have arisen in the eastern provinces which is identified as jihad by Muslim insurgents with the help of Middle Eastern extremist organizations.

5. Presently, Sri Lanka is on a progressive path to be developed as one of the prominent countries of Asia. This trend was initiated immediately after eradicating brutal terrorism which severely affected the development and the defence of Sri Lanka for almost thirty years. Accordingly, the issue of territorial defence has become one of the major concerns among citizens, political bodies, scholars and all who are interested in the well-being of the country.

6. During the period of war National defence arms in Sri Lanka expanded substantially both qualitatively and quantitatively. The tri forces should be developed further in order to maintain territorial defence. If the defence forces perform effectively and efficiently by using its strength and capabilities and overcome its loopholes, Sri Lanka can maintain its territorial defence against the current challenges of the country.
CHAPTER TWO

PROBLEM STATEMENT

7. What will be the changes necessary in the role of armed forces after eradicating the LTTE in order to maintain territorial defence?

RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

8. Future functions and duties of armed forces are distinct from past functions and duties. In the past Sri Lankan armed forces functioned against insurgencies. In the post war scenario, the role of armed forces has to be focused in order to maintain ensure territorial defence and act against internal and international challenges.
The objectives of this research are as follows

a. Examine the differences in the past and present role of armed forces of Sri Lanka

b. Identify the challenges of maintaining territorial defence in the current context

c. Identify the strengths and capabilities of the military force to adapt to the changes and exercise better national defence after the defeat of the LTTE

d. Determine how to face upcoming threats

e. Examine actions taken by other international communities in post war situations and the changed role played by their armed forces
METHODOLOGY

10. The required data for the research was drawn from the following sources;

a. Primary sources: Information was collected by interviewing intellectuals from military and legal authorities and distributing a questionnaire among the sample of the population and few other arbitrarily selected senior officers

b. Secondary sources: Information was gathered from relevant books, treaties, statutes, scholarly journals, internet, newspaper articles and periodicals.
LIMITATIONS

11. Limitations of the research are as follows

a. The time period discussed in insurgency activities in Sri Lanka was limited to that after 1970
b. Research is limited to the political and defence perspectives.
c. The study of international interference within Sri Lankan territory was limited to that of India, United States of America and the United Kingdom.
d. The search focuses on National Defence after defeating the LTTE within the context of a booming economy and the role of the military forces.
e. Secondary data collection was limited to books available at the KDU library and newspapers.
CHAPTER THREE
INSURGENCY

12. An insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime. An "insurgency" may include, but not necessarily use, guerrilla warfare.

13. Sri Lanka faced three main insurgencies in the recent past:

a. **1971 JVP insurgency**: The JVP, an ultra-leftist organization established in the late 1960s by RohanaWijeweera, attracted the support of students and poor Sinhalese youth in rural areas. In April 1971, the JVP led an armed uprising that resulted in the death of thousands of the rebels at the hands of the security forces.

b. **1989 JVP insurgency**: Adroitly exploiting the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and the widespread nationalist sentiments of large sections of the Sinhala people, the JVP began to terrorize both the state machinery and those sections of civil society opposed to its thinking and almost brought the State to its knees. Government forces captured and killed JVP leader RohanaWijeweera and his deputy in November 1989 in Colombo. By early 1990 they had killed or imprisoned the remaining JVP politburo and detained an estimated 7,000 JVP members.

c. **LTTE**: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, commonly known as the LTTE or the Tamil Tigers, was a separatist militant organization that was based in northern Sri Lanka. Founded in May 1976 by VellupillaiPrabhakaran, it waged a violent secessionist and nationalist campaign to create an independent state in the north and east of Sri Lanka for Tamil people. This campaign evolved into the Sri Lankan Civil War which ran from 1983 until 2009. At the height of its power, the LTTE possessed a well-developed militia and carried out many high-profile attacks, including the assassinations of several high-ranking Sri Lankan and Indian politicians. The LTTE is the only separatist militant organization to assassinate two world leaders, Sri Lankan President, RanasinghePremadasa in 1993 and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Civilian massacres, suicide bombings and acts of ethnic cleansing were integral parts of its pursuit to create a mono-ethnic Tamil Eelam. The
LTTE pioneered in the use of suicide belts and used light aircrafts in some of its attacks. As a result of its tactics, it is currently proscribed as a terrorist organization by 32 countries, but has extensive support amongst the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Europe and North America, and amongst some Tamils in India. However, Human Rights Organizations such as University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) alleges that the LTTE has killed at least 8,000 fellow Tamils considered to be traitors to its cause. LTTE founder Velupillai Prabhakaran headed the organization from its inception until his death in 2009.
COUNTERINSURGENCY

14. A counter-insurgency operation involves actions taken by the recognized government of a nation to contain or quell an insurgency taken up against it. In the main, the insurgents seek to destroy or erase the political authority of the defending authorities in a population they seek to control, and the counter-insurgent forces seek to protect that authority and reduce or eliminate the supplanting authority of the insurgents.

15. Counter-insurgency operations are common during war, occupation and armed rebellions. Counter-insurgency may be armed suppression of a rebellion, coupled with tactics such as divide and rule designed to fracture the links between the insurgency and the population in which the insurgents move. Because it may be difficult or impossible to distinguish between an insurgent, a supporter of an insurgency who is a non-combatant and entirely uninvolved members of the population, counter-insurgency operations have often rested on a confused, relativistic, or otherwise situational distinction between insurgents and non-combatants.

16. The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, "combatants" must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians. This basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is even more critical because our enemies have camouflaged themselves within the civilian population.
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE

17. Territorial defence of a country generally means the survival of the country by using its economic, military and political power and the effective exercise of the diplomacy. A country cannot maintain high level of Territorial defence giving priority to only one of the above-mentioned components since each component is of utmost importance. Moreover, to uplift the standards of the economy, military, political power and the exercise of diplomacy cannot be done focusing them separately.

18. Territorial defence is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic control, diplomacy, power projection and political power. Though initially it is focusing on military might, it includes economic, development and social aspects also. Accordingly, in order to possess territorial defence, a nation needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, etc. Security threats involve not only conventional foes, such as other nation-states, but also violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations; some authorities include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category.

19. Measures taken to ensure territorial defence include:

a. using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats
b. maintaining effective armed forces
c. implementing civil defense and emergency preparedness measures (including anti-terrorism legislation)
d. ensuring the resilience and redundancy of critical infrastructure
e. using intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and to protect classified information
f. using counterintelligence services or secret police to protect the nation from internal threats
RESTRICTED

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS

19. Rules and regulations which have passed through parliament regarding powers and functions of the armed forces especially under Army, Navy and Air force Acts and laws relating to emergency situations which are interpreted as insurgency under public security ordinance.

20. In the Constitution of the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka Article 30(1) states that, there shall be a President of the Republic of Sri Lanka, who is the Head of the State, the Head of the Executive and of the Government, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Article 76 states that, (2) delegation of legislative power - It shall not be a contravention of the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article for Parliament to make, in any law relating to public security, provision empowering the President to make emergency regulations in accordance with such law. Article 30 - states that the President is the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Therefore, His Excellency shall appoint three forces commanders.
CHAPTER FOUR

ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES BEFORE 2008

21. Extremist groups operating within both Tamil and Sinhalese communities were a grave threat to political stability and democratic institutions. Like Northern Ireland and Lebanon, Sri Lanka had become a country in which the vicious cycle of escalating violence had become so deeply entrenched that prospects for a peaceful resolution of social and political problems seemed remote. Extremism was generationally as well as ethnically based. Many youth seeing a future of diminished opportunities, had little faith in established political and social institutions and were increasingly attracted to radical solutions and the examples of movements abroad like the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

22. 1970 JVP Insurgency: The first major extremist movement in post-independence history of Sri Lanka was Sinhalese-Buddhist-rather than Tamil Hindu. The JVP, an ultra-leftist organization established in the late 1960s by Rohana Wijeweera, attracted the support of students and Sinhalese youth from rural areas. In April 1971, the JVP led an armed uprising that resulted in the death of thousands of the rebels at the hands of the security forces (one estimate is 10,000 fatalities). Historian, KM de Silva, calls the 1971 JVP insurrection "perhaps the biggest revolt by young people in any part of the world in recorded history, the first instance of tension between generations becoming military conflict on a national scale."

23. Although it suppressed the poorly organized revolt with little difficulty, the Bandaranaike government was visibly shaken by the experience. Fears of future unrest within the Sinhalese community undoubtedly made it reluctant, in a "zero-sum" economy and society, to grant significant concessions to minorities.

24. The Rise of the LTTE: After the assassination of Jaffna's mayor in 1975, Tamil militant groups accelerated their campaign of violence and destabilization. Their early targets included policemen, soldiers, and a number of Tamil politicians who were seen as collaborators with the Sinhalese-dominated government. The attacks were sporadic, relying largely on hit-and-run tactics. In July 1983, the LTTE ambushed a military convoy in Northern Province, killing thirteen soldiers. The attack sparked off a conflagration of communal violence in which approximately 350 Tamils were killed and as many as 100,000 were forced to flee their homes. Indiscriminate violence by Sinhalese mobs and members of the security forces led to insecurity and alienation among the Tamil population, and support for the insurgency grew dramatically. The year 1984 was marked by a substantial increase in terrorist attacks, and the militants turned...
increasingly against civilian targets. Major incidents included an armed attack against civilians in the ancient Sinhalese city of Anuradhapura (May 1985--146 dead).

25. As the Tamil movement grew and obtained more weapons, it changed tactics. A full-fledged insurgency that could confront the armed forces replaced the isolated terrorist incidents that had characterized the early period. By early 1986, the LTTE had won virtual control of the Jaffna Peninsula, confining the army to military bases and taking over the day-to-day administration of the city of Jaffna. In January 1987, the Tigers attempted to formalize their authority over the peninsula by establishing an "Eelam Secretariat." LTTE leaders claimed that this was intended simply to consolidate functions that the insurgents were already performing, i.e., collecting taxes and operating basic public services. Nonetheless, the government interpreted this move as a unilateral declaration of independence and thus a challenge to governmental authority.

26. Some former members of the group also function along with the Sri Lankan Army as a para-military group in military activities against the LTTE. They have also been accused of murders against political opponents. A prominent former PLOTE and later paramilitary leader ManikaDasan was killed by the LTTE in aclaymore bomb attack in the town of Vavuniya. Another paramilitary leader from the Batticlao region, Plote Mohan, was killed by LTTE assassins in Colombo in 2004. It is the fact the LTTE’s three decades old struggle for an independent Tamil state effectively challenged the state policies over the Tamils. It also attracted reasonable global support from the Tamil Diaspora as well as some quarters of the Western governments and policy makers.

27. However, the global political developments of the post September 11 terrorist attacks had radically contributed to the erosion of global sympathy for the LTTE. Sri Lanka’s Sinhala political class had succeeded in portraying the Tamil struggle as mere terrorist campaign and advantageously employed the global war on terrorism for its own counter insurgency activities and war against the LTTE. The LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009. The island of Sri Lanka has entered into a new phase and political condition was made to seek a meaningful reconciliation with the Tamils and other minorities to take the island into a post-conflict period. The questions therefore are; will the demise of the LTTE lead to the erosion of the rights of the non-Sinhalese in the island of Sri Lanka? Will the collapse of violent resistant by the LTTE further strengthen the hands of the Sinhala extremists who aspire to build Sinhalese only Sri Lanka or will it further alienate the minorities of Sri Lanka.

28. What Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka suggests is that politicization of ethnic distinctions by major political parties has weakened democracy and its institutions and thus has fuelled an ethnic violence and conflict. Democratic institutions in Sri Lanka need to be strengthened.
Political autonomy and power-sharing can help the Tamils to increase their level of trust in the state and its institutions. In other words, tensions among groups can be significantly reduced in Sri Lanka if the Sinhala political class genuinely seeks political compromise with the Tamil polity and other minorities through a feasible political solution that would go beyond the current British-imposed unitary structure. If there is a resistance to offer power sharing, the other option is partition which can possibly offer social and political security, as well as stability, to the different ethnic groups.
CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TOWARDS THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS

29. After defeating the LTTE, the armed forces were functioning with the government objectives during last two years, and as a result the armed forces complementarily joined in the development efforts in Northern and Eastern region of the country. In certain activities Sri Lanka government provided the financial resources and armed forces carried out the projects. Immediately after the war, many commendable initiatives were launched by Sri Lankan armed forces such as Reconstruction, rehabilitation, demining program, resettlement of IDFs.

RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME

30. The Security Forces are playing a pivotal role in the reconstruction of war-affected infrastructure, resettlement of thousands of civilians displaced by LTTE terrorists and reintegration of ex-combatants into society with the goal of promoting reconciliation. These peace warriors have contributed to the development of the North and East in the aftermath of the humanitarian operation.

31. They have helped revive the livelihood of people in the North and East while maintaining peace and stability in these areas. The North and East, engulfed by terrorism for more than 30 years are fast recovering due to Security Forces’ efforts. According to Army Spokesman Brigadier RuwanWanigasooriya, the Army helped save Rs.300 million to the coffers by providing manpower for a number of development projects. Armed forces have launched huge constructed and reconstructed projects. Constructing Road systems, bridges, Railway development, constructing and reconstructing schools, power and telecommunication projects, and Irrigational development are some of examples.

RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES

32. The final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War created 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were transferred to camps in Vavuniya District and detained there against their will. This process, together with the conditions inside the camps and the slow progress of resettlement in 2009 had attracted much concern and criticism from inside and outside Sri Lanka.

33. The resettlement program which was launched by the government with the end of the humanitarian mission in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is now in its final stage, According to the government figure. According to the Army Spokesman around, 284,000 persons in Northern and Eastern Provinces have been already resettled with another 6,022 persons to be resettled. These 6,022 are the persons who have to be resettled in Mullativu, Pudukudirippu,
Welhamulla and Waikkal areas and also to be resettled in certain areas after completing clearance of landmines. Almost 190,000 were staying with host families, while 30,000 were living in temporary camps, including more than 16000 in Menik Farm, and in transit situations

34. Resettlement programmes are carried out based on two processes; they are,
   a. Return to original location/habitat.
   b. Relocation to other areas.

35. According to above facts almost 297,000 “new” IDPs have returned so far. 9,287 IDPs have failed. This number includes 9,191 IDPs in Menik Farm Relief Village and 96 IDPs in Jaffna Ramavil transit camp. The government has resettled and released 271,199 IDPs.

36. Accordingly, 233,628 IDPs from Vavuniya, Manner, Trincomalee and other districts have been resettled in their places of origin. 9,851 IDPs in the Jaffna district have been resettled in their places of origin such as Jaffna, Manner, Vavuniya and Trincomalee. The government has resettled 95% of IDPs with the help of security forces so far under its programme for the speed resettlement. The Government reunited the IDPs who were released for humanitarian reasons with their relations.

37. According to the plan of the government, in next 3 months the all IDP camps will be closed but to rebuilding them back to their normal life will take at least 5 more years.

PROBLEMS WHEN COMMENCING RESETTLEMENT

38. This research identifies major problems when commencing the resettlement programs.
   a. Lands mines
   b. Regrouping LTTE cadres

39. Focusing these two major problems national defence involves demining programme and rehabilitation programme.

DEMINING PROGRAME

40. SL Army Started proper Humanitarian Demining operation in September 2003. Sri Lanka Army Humanitarian Demining Contingent was upgraded as a professional entity with all three components of Humanitarian Demining. They are Manual, Mechanical & Mine Detection Dog
(MDD). The aim of the demining programme is to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of landmine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) contamination.

41. As per ‘The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka 2010’ by the Economic Development Ministry mentioned, it could take another 10 years to clear the mine-contaminated land in the North and East of Sri Lanka, although it could be completed well before 2020 at the current progress being made since 2002. Over 300,000 people were displaced at the last stage of war in 2009; most have been re-settled to date with 6,569 remaining in camps as of January 2012. Since 2009 the areas abandoned due to landmine and ERW contamination had been cleared, including paddy land (101,827) hectares, water bodies (29,999) hectares, A class roads (538km), other roads over (1,500km), and railway lines (263km). This progress is mainly due to the high priority given by the government of Sri Lanka, with continuous technical and financial support from the government of Sri Lanka and the international community, in the mine action programme.

42. The National Mine Action Programme of Sri Lanka was initiated in 2002 with the assistance of UNDP, UNICEF, INGOs, NGOs and several donor countries (Australia, USA, Canada, Russia, Japan, Norway, India, China, EU) with the goal of creating a mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) free environment in support of the resettlement and development programmers of the Government of Sri Lanka. The initiation of humanitarian de-mining since 2002 has achieved many milestones during the process such as developing National Mine Action Standards in 2004 and 2010, setting up of government of Sri Lanka Mine Action Strategy in 2006 and 2010. In 2009, the Cabinet officially approved the setting up of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) under the Ministry of Economic Development which has led to gradual take over full responsibility for the coordination of mine action in Sri Lanka. ‘The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka 2010’ of the NMAC is the official government document to address the five pillars of mine action in Sri Lanka.

43. There are two Regional Mine Action Offices currently operating in Vavuniya, Jaffna with the sub office in Killinochchi. The District Steering Committee for Mine Action provided direction to the respective Regional Mine Action Offices in terms of mine action task priorities in support of the development projects and plans implemented by the district authorities within their district. The Mine Action Officer of the Regional Mine Action Offices acts as the secretary at the District Steering Committee for Mine Action meetings within the Regional Mine Action Offices area of responsibility and the Government Agent (GAs) of the respective district chair the District Steering Committee for Mine Action. De-mining (clearance) has been prioritized into three sectors such as high, medium and low according to the National Strategy for Mine Action.
44. According to Brigadier Lasantha Wickramasuriya RSP USP psc in the “Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South East Asia”, the significant increase in operations by the Sri Lankan Army's Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) along with eight active demining organizations, the Sri Lankan government expects to complete the demining operations in the North by the end of this year to resettle the internally displaced persons (IDPs) remaining in welfare camps. Sri Lanka Army humanitarian demining unit has accelerated the demining programme, and it has been achieved higher result so far.

**REHABILITATION PROGRAMS FOR THE WAR EFFECTED PEOPLE**

45. The Security Forces are playing a pivotal role in the reconstruction of war-affected infrastructure, resettlement of thousands of civilians displaced by LTTE terrorists and reintegration of ex-combatants into society with the goal of promoting reconciliation. These peace warriors have contributed to the development of the North and East in the aftermath of the humanitarian operation.

46. The Army had launched rehabilitation programs for 11,000 former LTTE combatants with the end of the war and Army personnel have played a vital role in their rehabilitation program.
CHAPTER FIVE
FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES

THE TAMIL DIASPORA

47. The Tamil Diaspora is a demographic group of Tamil people of Indian or Sri Lankan origin who have settled in other parts of the world. The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora refers to the global Diaspora of the people of Sri Lankan Tamil origin. It can be said to be a subset of the larger Sri Lankan as well as Tamil Diaspora.

48. Most of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora settled in North America, Europe, India and Australia. And most members of the Diaspora have migrated since the mid 1980s, primarily as a direct and indirect result of an ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka.

49. Activities of Tamil diaspora can be categorize in to
   a. Supporting LTTE fund collection activities
   b. Supporting LTTE propaganda activities
   c. Spreading the Eelam ideology internationally
   d. Human smuggling with the assistance of the LTTE
   e. Drug trafficking
   f. Engaging in intelligence and diplomatic activities
   g. Encouraging the LTTE organization to achieve the eelam through provisional, transnational government of Tamil Eelam

49. Today they want to use their load of money to fulfill the dream of the dead terrorists to set up a separate Tamil State in Sri Lanka, not with arms and ammunitions but by using the foreign Governments and Human rights activists carry out a different sort of “terrorism” to realize their object of Tamil Eelam State. Those of the West have fallen into the “money trap” of these terrorist front Agencies of the Tamil Diaspora who are the supporters of terrorism in Sri Lanka.

50. Therefore, they are carrying out a massive campaign to get the support of the influential persons among the educated class of the Western countries, to support the cause of the Tamils the minority community in Sri Lanka to break up Sri Lanka and form a separate Tamil Eelam State, as it had been thwarted by the “unexpected” elimination of the whole lot of terrorists in Sri Lanka.
51. In current context to defeat Tamil Diaspora government have to take 3 key actions:
   a. Develop international communication and media network
   b. Build up good diplomatic relationships with other countries
   c. Developing favourable Tamil political leadership in Sri Lanka

52. The main problem we are facing is Diaspora communication network. On other hand they are developing diplomatic connections with western countries. That is why we need to have good communication network for Sri Lanka. Through good Tamil political leadership government can respond to the international community. Tamils in Sri Lanka will also be satisfied to have their own leadership.

53. The reduction of Tamil unrest is also a very important factor in the post war scenario. Government has to quickly establish civil administration system in northern area. It will take some more time as it directly affects national security. Defence ministry has to decide very accurately how they going to reduce armed forces in these areas allocate to them for other development tasks.
CHAPTER SIX

STRENGTHENING OF THE TRI SERVICES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE

THE ROLE OF SRI LANKA ARMY

54. Sri Lanka is the first country that militarily defeated a terrorist organization successfully for the first time after the Second World War. LTTE which had a separate army, air force, navy and separate courts and judges tried to establish Tamil Eelam in northern region provinces. Royal army had evolved to Sri Lanka army in 1949. First army commander was Sinclair the earl of Catchiness. First Sri Lankan descendant army commander was Maj. Gen A.M Muttukumaru who was a Sri Lankan Tamil.

55. In late president Hon. JR Jayawardana’s period ( in 1980’s) Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam had organized in Jaffna area with the leadership of Prabakaran. Eelam war was started and army had to do the security and protection process of northern area from LTTE insurgencies through their arms power.

56. In the period of President R. Premadasa “Operation Liberation” and “Operation Wadamarachci” was operated. Yet it was stopped due to Indian political intervention to our integrity. Army had to play a combined role with Indian Peace Keeping Forces to prevent Tamil insurgency troops like LTTE, EPRLF and EPDP.

57. Former president Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranayaka’s period army was dealing with dangerous guerilla activities of LTTE. Gen. R.D.S Daluwatta, Lt GenShanthaKottegoda, Lt. Gen. LayanalBalagalla had done key role in her office. Operation elephant pass, operation Jayasikuru, operationriviresa were some of operations which can distinguish from other strategies of army.

58. In 2002 UNP government period Sri Lanka had entered to cease fire agreement with LTTE. Therefore army played silent period. There were no fighting role in this era. After the defeat of RanilWickramasingha’s parliament, the present President, His Excellency MahindaRajapaksha started to exercise the office.

59. In humanitarian war period army had exercised major role to abolish LTTE roots and their threat. Countering LTTE through man power and weapons was in high standard during the last Elam war period. Army had a complex structure as infantry, supporting, intelligence and special forces like SF and commando. Therefore army has good organization to counter to
enemy forces and provide defence for sovereignty. Sri Lanka Army had succeeded 4th Eelam war and diminished LTTE roots physically.

60. At present army has major role to play for territorial defence and control external efforts from interventions in our sovereignty. Therefore army has to be used for not only security functions but also development process. As engineers, infantrymen and also main working source of the development process army can give their fullest corporation to maintain territorial defense.

**THE ROLE OF SRI LANKA NAVY**

61. Sri Lankan navy has contributed largely throughout the last war period in order to eradicate the most ruthless terrorist organization, the LTTE. In post war scenario, the role of the navy has changed and extended to protect the territorial waters and international waters in order to maintain territorial defence. One of the main factors of this role is to execute against sea piracy. Many believed that piracy was in control after considering the achievements individual states and navies have achieved in areas off Malacca Strait and other regions. Despite these achievements, it’s now high time to realize that the menace has been only controlled but not eradicated. Today we witness the emerging global threat of piracy through Somali pirates. Recent attacks saw the emerging new tactics, advanced weapons, ability to strike in deep seas, well organized teams and the skill to strike at will.

62. The world has never witnessed pirates becoming this hazardous. If we think this is the highest height they can attain, it’s wrong. The possible combination of pirates and terrorism can pose a threat to the maritime environment and world security. In this backdrop no sea area/vital Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS) can be termed safe due to the nature of piracy.

63. At the outset, Sri Lanka Navy has much more to offer with the huge amount of experience and expertise they have acquired after having fought with the LTTE sea tigers for nearly three decades, successfully defeated and at the end had total sea control over the seas around the country. To achieve these results, SLN had the best men, tactics and importantly new strategies which they used against a deadly force. This wealth of experience can be effectively used in eradicating sea piracy, a phenomenon which is fast becoming dangerous and completely uncontrollable if world community does not react fast. Responsibility of navy is to make sure that sea routes are kept safe from unwanted usage.

64. Apart from sea piracy issue navy should act in order to barricade the international illegal arms business on the territorial waters, block illegal migrants and asylum seekers, block cargo
theft and human smuggling and cease drugs and weapon smuggling. In order to get complete these objectives SLN has to,

a. Achieve regional Co-operation with navies - Sri Lankan navy has to collaborate with regional forces as Indian navy, Indian coastal guards and Chinese navy etc. and carry out combined military exercises.

b. Engage in intelligence Sharing – SLN should share the intelligence with regional navies.

c. Utilize Technology – Navy should gain new and latest technology which is useful for deep sea operations.

d. Develop the SLN fleet – The SLN fleet should develop strengthen as to operate in deep sea also.

e. Improve the coastal guard service – The coastal guard service of SLN should be developed and the necessary legal powers should be granted.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF SRI LANKA AIR FORCE

65. Having played a decisive and impressive role in decimating the LTTE, the SLAF seems to be searching for clues to its' future role. All indications from Sri Lanka are that the obviously unwise attempts to purchase a fleet of Mig-29s are now permanently put off. If the effectiveness of the F7G's given free of charge by the Chinese eliminated any pretexts to a need to counter the LTTE's airborne threat, the end of combat with the decimation of the terror group has completely ended any speculation in that direction.

66. As Sri Lanka moves towards reconciliation and reconstruction, the defence needs will move from a purely operational perspective to strategic. The desperate need we had to acquire easy to maintain work horses such as the Mig27s no longer exist, while with time Sri Lanka will become more self-sufficient in their ability to deal with ground threats purely with ground forces backed by armor. In the worst case scenario the support of air mobile units supported by helicopter gunships could easily become an adequate security arrangement.

67. Of greater interest will be the need to establish a maritime border patrol such as the proposed coast guard with ample fire power. Quite obviously the government will have to look to the SLN to develop such a force using its impressively combat proven resources. The changes
to the SLN's hierarchy at the very top may lead to a re-vamping of an ambitious fleet air arm, which may be limited to helicopter and UAV operations from the larger bodied off shore patrol craft.

68. How these short and long term future needs will be interpreted by the defence establishment in the post-war scenario will remain to be seen. But for now, Sri Lanka will not see any Mig29s in its air force.

69. The Sri Lanka Air Force has developed its own unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which is being tested at the moment, CDS and Air Force Commander RoshanGunathilakesaid. He also said the Air Force would upgrade its air to air capabilities in the near the future and encourage more research and development programmes.

70. Sri Lanka Air Force has to purchase new aircraft as well since it have to phase out old aircraft. It has to train pilots properly to meet high standards of future aircraft. It need to identify the areas that need to improve. An Air Force should always be ready to fall in line with the advanced technology.
CHAPTER SEVEN

LESSONS LEARNT FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

71. Sri Lanka achieved great moral and strategic triumph by dismantling the LTTE in May 2009. Sri Lanka is the first country in the 21st century to have defeated a terrorist organization and an insurgent movement. The Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite so much of resources and so many human fatalities and casualties, have not been able to bring law and order to those two countries. After engaging in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the US is now planning to withdraw. The insurgency still rages. In the global canvass of terrorism, the LTTE rank very high. Many said that the Lebanese Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers belong to that class of terrorist groups that was very resilient. They were very difficult to dismantle. In many ways, the achievement of Sri Lanka in defeating the LTTE is a very unique example.

72. What we have to understand is that conflicts by their very nature are complex, and the post conflict situations are even more complex. When we come to that point, where we decide that we have passed the conflict and we are into the post conflict scenario or into that phase, three main actors can be founded in the field.

73. Firstly, we find the state. But the state is going to be represented mostly by the armed forces because armed forces are going to be the major presence among other government mechanisms. Secondly, we find the society at large. Thirdly, find the Militants on one side, which is opposed to the state and also to the armed forces. All these actors are going to have different states of mind. The society is going to be traumatized, wearied, cynical, and with a little bit of tinge of vengefulness. Then the militants are going to be having a state of mind where they are going to feel defeated, resigned, partly ostracized in the society, and of course fearful of their future. In this case, the civil law enforcement agencies are going to be either absent from the scene or not in the optimal state.

SWARTH, PAKISTAN

74. When integrate the experience of Swarth in Pakistan with certain important things at present that the armed forces need to consider in their operations, during the post conflict scenario. The important thing here is that the leadership of the armed forces will have to remember that most of the services that they provided for the society immediately after the conflict cannot be continued in the long run. The leadership needs to revive their role and they will have to integrate with the critical leadership of the government and will need to deal with the issues, together with the relevant departments, to restore the respective services in the affected areas. Thereafter, in the long run, there will be a time in which the responsibilities of the respective services need to be handed over to the respective departments in order to run the
services in line with their professional standards. When coming to markets, they are actually the symbol of normalcy in the area. The armed forces can encourage markets to be opened and the life to go about in a very normal fashion. Transport is another area that is going to be a part of the services that need to draw attention.

75. There is a need of monitoring them and in most cases, you have to support these individuals socially and financially for their families to stand on their own feet and become useful members of the society. In order for the society to move towards normalcy, you want the former enemies to actually end the curtain of the past and move forward into the future with proper social integration. Then there is a need of a transition in the system. The economy has to guarantee better psychosocial standards. In Swarth of Pakistan, the leadership over there and the army in particular helped in organizing certain events, certain forums with the people, which brought them together to engage in things that can lift the spirit of the people and get them to hold activities with positive mind sets.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

76. Many external reports have now been written making several demands of the Sri Lankan government intermsofactions taken towards the end of the hostilities. International pressure can be helpful, especially if it propels a country to prioritize a specific course of needed action but undue pressure is unhelpful. That is down to Sri Lanka itself to resolve these issues with the assistance of the International community—but only if they ask for it. We have all seen how South Africa resolved its issues internally after acknowledging condemnation of its practices from international sources and Sri Lanka can achieve resolution also. Piling unreasonable pressure on Sri Lanka is counterproductive and the country and its people have not got through healing process that is not best served by external interventions. However, there is also a need to strengthen partnerships between United Nations agencies, NGOs and the Sri Lankan government.

**NORTHERN IRELAND**

77. There are many similarities between the conflict in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. The use of force in controlling Northern Ireland had been prevalent for more than 300 years. The British Armed Forces were deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 to protect the Catholic minority who were coming under attack from the Protestant majority. This was very quickly reversed when the IRA started to represent the Catholic minority and started their major bombing and assassination campaign (Black Friday). Many attempts were made at reconciliation to no avail until a vital meeting took place between our politicians and known terrorists. Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness are now seen as statesmen despite their violent and
Some general lesson learned from global experiences are as follows

a. Resettlement programs require long-term commitment and financial investment.
b. Try to avoid placing too many ex-combatants into public service employment as this can lead to a military solution to civil problems, which is not always acceptable to the population.
c. Avoid setting up a dependency network; it should be supporting but not dependent.
d. All combatants from both sides will include those with a “winners and losers” mentality; some will be skilled workers, and others may have no skills. We must be careful not to treat all combatants as a single group.
e. Each combatant will have individual and distinct needs and potential.
f. Officers who have attended formal Command and Training courses as well as gaining experienced during combat will have leadership and organizational skills that can be valuable to the reconstruction of society.
g. Combatant skills can be applied to military or criminal ends.
h. It is the opinion of this author that benefits for combatants should not be offered based on rank and position; they should be equitable across all ranks.
i. Resettlement training should be relevant to the individuals’ aspirations, where possible, but also relevant to the available job market.
j. When downsizing, it is essential to consider potential recruitment drive in order to maintain national balance. This is not always possible but effort should be taken to demonstrate willingness to work with ex-combatants from both sides. In the UK, for example, a one-time wedge had very few black people in our Armed Forces, and very few women. We have now integrated the minorities into our Services.
k. Resettlement planning should include families of the combatants and also community leaders.
l. Resettlement should take place in normal colleges/schools and should not be completed in “special” camps.
m. Resettlement is not finite and combatants should be advised that this is their opportunity to take a new
n. A good strategy is essential to making the resettlement process work
79. There is no doubt during the PostConflict period there is a major role for the Armed Forces. The difficulty, especially for Sri Lanka, isto get all of the combatants into oneroom where they can develop lasting peace that will be acceptable to bothsides. The role of the Armed Forces in this scenario is to protect these talks and to prevent distracting attacks from either side. There will be many pressures as we move forward from the International Community, the NGOs and more worryingly from the media. There will no doubtbediscussion that the Armed Forces in Sri Lanka are too large and now that there is no threat, we can reducethenumbers. This is a ridiculous argument and shouldnot be takenseriously at this stage for when you reduce the number too quickly you cannot alwaysget the strength and the experience back quickly. Look at the UK in 1983 when the government of the day reduced the size of our Maritime forces and then had to commandeercruiseshipstogettothe Falklands.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

80. After the end of 30 years’ war with LTTE which was considered as the most terrible and dangerous terrorist organization, as country, Sri Lanka is looking for its own freedom and brilliant industrial, economic, technical, social and spiritual development to tally with the new developing world. However, even though guns remain silent, a permanent peace seems to still be a distance reality. Threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka are still working in different forms. Hope for permanent peace could be destroyed and it would push the country back to another conflict. Internal cohesion is required to insulate the country from disruptive forms that attempt to undermine the military victory.

81. According to our research we found that national defence can give huge support to economy development of the country. Soon after the war the maximum support of the armed forces was harnessed for demining, resettlement, and rehabilitation projects. Developing infrastructure facilities in war affected area should be done with the help of the tri forces. Armed forces have all facilities complete these tasks. They have well trained man power, machines equipment in every field. Therefore utilizing these facilities for national economy development is a key factor in this scenario.

82. There may be lot of threats we have to face in future. Tamil Diaspora is the major challenge to Sri Lanka at present. They provide money and weapons to LTTE. So the government should take necessary steps to control their function. Navy has special role to stop arms smuggling and other illegal activities of Tamil Diaspora.

83. In the current context to defeat Tamil Diaspora government has to take 3 key actions.

   a. Develop international communication and media network to Sri Lanka
   b. Build up good diplomatic relationship with other countries.
   c. Developing favourable Tamil political leadership to Sri Lanka.

84. Regrouping of LTTE is another threat Sri Lanka has to face. From the data we gathered there is a lot of evidence that they going regroup again. Rehabilitation of LTTE cadres is very important to avoid regrouping.

85. The intelligence sector should play a vital role in the post war scenario. Military intelligence should be taken to a higher standard and proper spying is required in order to identify the new threats to the nation. Future plans and preparations of the military will be mainly based on the information from the intelligence. The military should be strong, strategic, and tactical and patient even in a time there is no war in the country. The intelligence and
military investigations should be conducted regularly. We also have to make ourselves alert to the new trends of the local and global terrorism.

86. Our country should have powerful intelligence service. We have to build up international relationships with countries to develop our intelligence service. For example American CIA service, Israel, India, Russia have the most powerful intelligence services. We can get their assistance to develop our intelligence service.
RECOMMENDATIONS

87. According to our research we have clearly seen that there is a burning requirement of finding a solution to rebuild this country. Therefore, Government can consider about three principle categories forces can invested other than war fighting. They are,
   a. Humanitarian Assistance
   b. Social economic development
   c. Political engagement

88. There is a responsibility of the government with the support of the security forces and Non - Government Organizations, to develop social infrastructure, social harmony, and peace. The Non - Governmental Organizations are assisting in community development projects where the security forces are involved in demining as well as development work under the guidance of the Armed Forces in Sri Lanka.

89. The secondary task of the security forces is to continue the resettlement program of the government. The resettlement should be done within the expected period of time. Rehabilitation, except for the combatants as per the government programme, is being done in line with the development plan. After doing the initial resettlement, there is a need of re-integrating them into the society.

90. Public and private sector partnership is another area in which the security forces have assisted. These programmes were carried out in northern areas where terrorist activities were detrimental in comparison to the other parts of the region.

91. With respect to resettlement, there are plenty of agencies, which are going to be involved in the resettlement process as part time counter parts. Again, in this regard the armed forces will have to share the main burden in organizing the return of displaced persons and their settlement. The issues with respect to displaced persons are extremely important because unless you are able to get them back to their homes in their respective areas, you simply cannot initiate other normalizing activities or steps.

92. Expand and develop the Intelligence Services to meet the international standards, as well as develop and maintain good relationship with foreign intelligence arms.

93. Introducing and training the tri forces in the latest technological advances in security.

94. Building new regional and strengthening existing regional ties.
95. Protecting international sea lines of communication that pass close to Sri Lanka securing the Indian trade routes.

96. Remove high security zones and maintain military presence at strategic locations throughout the country.

97. Injecting military officers into inefficient government organizations and to government projects.

98. The syllabi in tri-services academies in Sri Lanka are based on the early British system. Some countries like Nepal have introduced new syllabus to their military academies by combining British system and the American system which suite to the future. We also should improve the military syllabus as for the Sri Lanka and as for the future. For this we can use the experiences which we have gained through last operations.

99. Develop further links between KDU where the cadet officers obtain their degree and foreign prestigious military academies such as Sandhurst in UK and West Point in USA. Through this, we should try to make available opportunities for cadets and military officers to do their post graduate studies in those Universities, which will help to improve the technology and foreign relations of tri-services in Sri Lanka.
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